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Deriving a Solution to Venezuela: Civil-Military Relations Can Help 
George Fust – 03 July 2019 
How does one define “healthy” civil-military relations? The simplest definition would suggest a nation’s 
military is subordinate to its ruling body. In other words, the guys with all the guns listen to those without 
any. So how then would we evaluate this relationship in a country like Venezuela? The military has 
remained loyal and subordinate to the ruling body, so does it meet the criteria? It is providing the only 
real stability for the country despite the questionable legitimacy of this government. Our starting 
definition is thus far too simple. And yet, when you add layers of complexity or depth to the discussion, it 
becomes difficult to grade the health of a particular nation’s civil-military relations. Comparative analysis 
is difficult if not impossible in the field of civil-military relations.  
The effective functioning of this relationship is best evaluated by the citizens of the respective nation. The 
citizens get to decide what government they want and how it operates, unless the military prevents it. All 
too often, we (US policy makers) apply our western Huntingtonian tradition as the example others should 
follow. This is impractical and has the tendency to result in poor policy options. We cannot apply the US 
model to fix or improve others in all instances. Instead, what if we identified the outcome we want, and 
then leveraged the existing framework to meet that goal? Attempting to alter the framework is futile, 
unless military intervention or the fomenting of a coup are on the table. The alternative, however, requires 
a citizen-like understanding of the country in question. For this brief analysis, Venezuela will serve as a 
case study to highlight how this recommended approach might work.  
The Venezuelan military is arguably the last functioning apparatus of the government. The soldiers 
currently manage and run the oil industry, perform trash removal duties, and even change lightbulbs. As 
such, their political capital is high. They have ample leverage on the government should they demand 
change. So why then are they taking directives from a leader who is not recognized by the UN or OAS or 
most of the Western world? Recent statements by Venezuela’s Defense Minister offer insight. He 
suggests “Doing the right thing is doing what's written in the constitution. ... Doing the right thing is 
respecting the will of the people." An interesting take and the “correct” answer according to our own view 
of civil-military relations. Yet, who does he consider to be “the people”? Is he following all aspects of the 
constitution or only those portions that benefit his agenda? 
 Article 328 in Chapter III of Venezuela’s recognized constitution states:   
The National Armed Forces constitute an essentially professional institution, with no political 
orientation, organized by the State to guarantee the independence and sovereignty of the Nation 
and ensure the integrity of its geographical space, through military defense, cooperation for the 
purpose of maintaining internal order and active participation in national development, in 
accordance with this Constitution and the law. In performing their functions, they are at the 
exclusive service of the Nation, and in no case at the service of any person or political 
partisanship. The pillars on which they are founded are discipline, obedience and subordination.  
Key phrases such as “no political orientation” or “exclusive service of the Nation” stand out because 
common practice now suggests rampant violation of such principles. The constitution is used as an excuse 
to legitimize the military’s power when in reality, their loyalty is to the acting President, Maduro. The 
suggestion that the Army is acting on behalf of “the people” or “the country” is a fallacy. The “country” 
or “the people” are defined as literal card-carrying members of the party. The system in place is socialist. 
If you want to eat, you must show your party identification to receive aid. Those who question the 
government’s legitimacy through protest or other means are stripped of their cards and viewed as a non-
citizen. Therefore, only those who are loyal are considered “the people” and eligible for the protection 
provided by the military. A convenient way for the military to protect its political capital.   
This mere wave-top understanding reveals numerous structural civil-military weaknesses if we use the US 
framework. This is not however uncommon in Latin America. So, then what is the solution? It depends 
on our objectives. The US and dozens of other nations want Juan Guaido recognized as the legitimate 
President. His claim to the position relies on the same constitution that Venezuela’s military is using to 
support Maduro. Can they both be right? The military has very real incentives to continue its support of 
the Maduro government. For example, Maduro has not and likely will not prosecute military members for 
previous or future war crimes. Guaido has recently claimed his desire to grant amnesty however that is 
less certain. Soldiers burned these amnesty letters indicating their support for the current government. 
Despite the negative civil-military implications of granting amnesty, the US and other Guaido supporters 
should continue to offer firm written agreements or proclamations to guarantee amnesty.  
This is just one example of a myriad of civil-military relations aspects that should be analyzed in any 
attempt at crafting policy towards Venezuela. Any solution to the current crisis in the country must 
involve the Venezuelan military and its general officer corps. Even an attempt to end the humanitarian 
crisis with aid convoys must have the military’s support.  
From a theoretical comparative civil-military relations viewpoint1, Venezuela fails to meet most of the 
criteria of healthy relations. For example, the civilian government depends on the military as the primary 
means of internal security, the military has been employed against fellow citizenry in a policing role,  
civilian institutions are not so powerful as to dominate politics, bribery and other forms of corruption are 
present in the military, the country has a history of coups, strength of civilian institutions is low, the 
military is an economic stakeholder, the military is immersed in the daily administrative details of the 
government, and ultimately the military behavior undermines civilian supremacy in the long run. Policy 
that attempts to change any of these towards the healthier end of the spectrum will likely fail in the near 
term. It certainly will not help Guaido be endorsed and supported by the military.  
An answer key to Venezuela exists. It starts with an understanding of the current system and ends with 
developing policy that works with the existing framework. Only after near term goals, such as the 
recognition of Guaido or the stabilization of the economy can structural changes be implemented to 
promote healthier long-term relationships between the military and the civilian government.   
1 Numerous sources and authors were used to generate these criteria: Finer, Samuel E. The Man on Horseback: The 
Role of the Military in Politics. Praeger, 1962; Nordlinger, Eric A. Soldiers in politics: military coups and 
governments. Prentice Hall, 1977; Edmonds, Martin. Armed services and society. No. 2. Leicester University, 1988; 
Koonings, Kees, and Dirk Kruijt, eds. Political armies: The military and nation building in the age of democracy. 
Zed Books, 2002; Feaver, Peter D. Armed servants: Agency, oversight, and civil-military relations. Harvard 
University Press, 2009. 
 
 
 
 
